

Lesson Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Lesson ID: 61844-61844

Title: 03 INTELLIGENCE: RED CELL ---- VALUE, CHALLENGES, COMPOSITION

Operation/Exercise Name: HUNTER WARRIOR

Observed: 01 Mar 1997

Originator: MCCDC DOCTRINE

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5. (U) OBSERVATION:

The concept of a "Red Cell" offers improved intelligence support to the MAGTF Commanding Officer's (CO's) and key staff officers planning and decision making. Its specified role and how it executes its mission, location and C2 relationships. However, it requires closer examination to ensure its most productive employment.

6. (U) DISCUSSION:

The Red cell concept is to provide a "thinking threat" during wargaming. SPMAGTF(X)'s conops envision the Red Cell primarily in support of the Planning and Shaping cell to serve as a tool for assessing threat capabilities and vulnerabilities, and ensuring these are realistically considered during friendly Course of Action (COA) development. Specifically, it is to conduct a "balanced analysis of the proposed COA using the action-reaction counteraction methodology" during wargaming in order to "think ahead of the threat by looking at threat options from its point of view, and then determining a friendly action which will control tempo and achieve mission success."

A critical requirement of this concept is the identification of SPMAGTF(X) Marines (or other service personnel) with specialized knowledge critical to the type of operation, who are then tasked to apply their unique expertise and insight for enemy assessments. For example, during the AWE the selection and assignment to the Red Cell of Marines with armor and tracked vehicle specialties who were also intimately familiar with the 29 Palms operating area and 7th Marines operational methods to lead the Red Cell effort. Such expertise can generally be assumed resident within on-scene Naval forces regardless of the type of operation or the operational environment. The Red Cell team formed will thus always be task-organized based upon the unique situation ---- raising questions regarding adjustments needed if such individuals typically fill other key ARG/MAGTF billets, training needed to allow their immediate integration within ECOC operations, etc.

At its core, the Red Cell concept marries Marines with specialized operational or other functional expertise (for example, CSS Marines during a humanitarian assistance operation) with traditional intelligence analysts and other intelligence operations personnel. How best to do this ---- i.e., the C2 relationships and operational TTP between Red Cell and other ECOC cells' intelligence Marines ---- is open to question. During the HW-AWE, Red Cell predominantly operated autonomously in support of the

Commander and P&S (then the ECC and finally CIS). While this is a flexible approach, the risk is that at any given moment there could be up to four intelligence estimates of the enemy: that from CIS' intelligence section (the sole element that sees all raw data and develops intelligence products), that from the P&S intelligence officer, that from the ECC intelligence officer, and finally, that of Red Cell. The danger is self-evident: multiple, potentially contradictory interpretations (whether elements or broad overall assessments) being presented to a variety of planners & decision makers in a manner that can not itself be tracked or managed.

7. (U) LESSON LEARNED:

N/A

8. (U) RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That further examination and analysis of the Red Cell mission, C2 relationship and operational model and relevant AWE exercise data be conducted within the combat development process, with special attention to:

a. Determining whether it should be integrated within the CIS intelligence section or the P&S cell, or if it should remain autonomous.

b. Determining inter-ECOC C2 relationships and operational TTP in order to minimize risk associated with multiple intelligence estimates/assessments.

9. (U) COMMENTS:

DOTES Assessment

D: X

O: N/A

T: X

E: N/A

S: N/A
